I N T R O D U C T I O N
In 2004 U.S.-Vietnam relations continued to progress across a broad range of issues. However, as has been the case since the two countries normalized relations in 1995, the pace of progress has been incremental and not without controversy. For both countries closer bilateral ties remain a sensitive issue for historical, political, and geopolitical reasons. In the United States, opposition to closer relations with Vietnam comes from several sources. In Congress, certain members argue that the United States cannot have a close relationship with Vietnam until Hanoi improves its human rights record, especially religious freedom. Veterans groups have accused Hanoi of not doing enough to address the Prisoner or War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) issue. Voices within the VietnameseAmerican community oppose Hanoi, whose Communist forces they fled in 1975. Equally, however, within each of these constituencies are advocates of closer ties with Vietnam. In Vietnam, feelings toward the United States are also mixed. At the leadership levelespecially among senior leaders who fought against the United States in the war-there are suspicions concerning U.S. intentions toward Vietnam. One suspicion is that policymakers in Washington seek to undermine the Communist regime through "peaceful evolution." Another concern is that the United States challenges the country's territorial integrity through its alleged support for the Montagnard separatist movement in the Central Highlands. On the other hand, the Communist authorities in Hanoi recognize that their own legitimacy is tied to continued economic growth, and that much of this growth depends on closer trade ties with the United States. Geopolitically, Vietnam does not want the United States to dominate Southeast Asia but it is also anxious about China's rising power in the region. Vietnamese leaders privately acknowledge the stabilizing influence the U.S. military presence has in East Asia. But equally Vietnam must carefully calibrate its political and security relationship with the United States to avoid antagonizing China. Hanoi must balance its relations with the United States and China, and therefore cannot be seen to be tilting toward one side over the other.
P O L I T I C A L R E L A T I O N S
A t the political level U.S.-Vietnam relations are generally good but are subject to periods of turbulence caused by U.S. criticism of Vietnam's human rights record, particularly religious freedoms. 2004 witnessed moderate turbulence in this regard. In February, the U.S. Department of State released its annual report on human rights practices in Vietnam. Although the report labeled Hanoi's human rights record as "poor" and accused the government of committing "serious abuses," it also noted some slight improvements in the situation. In July the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act, which lambasted Hanoi for its "policy of harassment, discrimination, and intimidation" against those critical of the central government. The Vietnamese government condemned the legislation as "untimely and detrimental to bilateral relations" and interference in its internal affairs. The bill subsequently died in the Senate. The legislation would have prevented the U.S. government from increasing the amount of non-humanitarian assistance to Hanoi above the current level of $40 million. It would also have authorized the government to spend $4 million a year to support 
E C O N O M I C R E L A T I O N S F
or the Vietnamese government, economic growth is a priority because of the legitimacy it bestows on the regime. The Vietnamese economy grew at seven to eight percent per year through 2004. The United States obviously represents a very important market and source of investment for Vietnam, and Hanoi calculates that closer economic ties with America will add one or two percentage points to GDP growth each year. The United States supports continued economic growth in Vietnam not only because it offers opportunities to U.S. businesses and consumers, but also because it believes economic growth will ultimately result in changes that favor a freer market, society and political system.
In July 2000 the United States and Vietnam signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). The BTA is designed, over a ten-year period, to eliminate non-tariff barriers, cut tariffs on a number of U.S. exports, and allow Vietnam greater access to the U. Membership of the WTO is an urgent priority for Vietnam because it remains subject to U.S. textile quotas until its membership is approved. So long as Vietnam remains outside the WTO its garment industry will be at a distinct disadvantage compared to those countries that are already WTO members, such as China. Washington and Hanoi are currently in negotiations over WTO entry. Publicly, Washington has voiced its support for Vietnamese membership. During 2004 U.S. and Vietnamese officials held several rounds of discussions on WTO membership. The Vietnamese government is concerned that human rights issues may delay the country's accession, though the Bush administration has not officially linked the two issues.
Despite the rapid increase in trade volume, U.S.-Vietnam economic relations have not been without problems. In July 2004 the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) ruled that Vietnamese shrimp producers had been dumping their produce on the U.S. market at below market cost, and levied preliminary anti-dumping tariffs of between 12 and 93 percent on imported Vietnamese shrimp. The ruling followed a similar decision in 2003 against the Vietnamese catfish industry. Seafood is one of Vietnam's biggest export earners, and Vietnamese producers called on the DoC to re-assess its decision. In early December the DoC revised downwards the anti-dumping tariffs to between 4.13 and 25.76 percent. When the decision was announced the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers renewed its call to overturn the decision. Although the final decision pleased U.S. shrimp producers it was not welcomed by U.S. seafood distributors who predicted American consumers would now pay more for shrimp products.
L E G A C Y I S S U E S
A s Vietnam and the United States look to the future they must also deal with issues left over from the Vietnam War. On the U.S. side the most important issue is recovering the bodies of U.S. service personnel killed during the war. For Hanoi the salient issues are the aftereffects of Agent Orange, unexploded ordinance (UXO), and recovering the bodies of 300,000 Vietnamese military personnel. While the United States acknowledges the significant progress that has been made on resolving the POW/MIA issue, the Vietnamese have called on Washington to be more accountable for the effects of Agent Orange and UXO. However, both governments seem to have made a conscious decision not to allow legacy issues to hinder the forward momentum of bilateral ties. Indeed the search for POW/MIA has helped lay the groundwork for U.S.-Vietnam military-to-military ties.
As Of particular interest to the U.S. side are documents relating to American losses in areas of Cambodia and Laos which were under Vietnamese control. Second, joint investigation and recovery teams will be allowed access to areas in the Central Highlands. U.S. access to this area was suspended in early 2001 following the outbreak of ethnic unrest. Third, Hanoi agreed to extend the search for MIAs to the sea. However, negotiations on this issue may be problematic given Hanoi's sensitivities concerning the presence of U.S. naval vessels in Vietnamese territorial waters.
While both governments have expressed satisfaction with progress on the POW/MIA issue, the Vietnamese have called on the United States for more help in tackling other legacy issues, specifically Agent Orange and UXO. Agent Orange was a herbicide designed to defoliate jungle areas in order to deny cover to Vietcong guerillas. Between 1961 and 1971 U.S. and South Vietnamese forces sprayed approximately 80 million liters of Agent Orange across the south of the country. Agent Orange contained dioxin, which increases the risk of cancers, immune deficiencies, and reproductive and nervous system problems. Hanoi asserts that the toxic dioxin spread into the food chain resulting in serious health problems for nearly one million people, including birth defects in 150,000 children. In March 2002 the United States and Vietnam agreed to conduct scientific research into the impact of Agent Orange. As these studies continue however, the Vietnam-based Vietnam Association of Victims of Agent Orange (VAVA) is seeking recourse through U.S. courts. In January 2004, VAVA filed a lawsuit in a Federal Court in New York against U.S. chemical companies that produced the toxic defoliant. The suit, lodged on behalf of three adults in Vietnam suffering from alleged Agent Orange-related health problems, seeks compensatory and punitive damages against more than 30 U.S. companies.
The third legacy issue concerns UXO. The Vietnamese government estimates that 350,000 tons of UXO remain scattered across the country, resulting in nearly 2,000 civilian deaths each year. 
T
he security relationship between Vietnam and the United States can best be described as nascent. Although security cooperation is advancing, it is doing so in an incremental fashion, partly because of the sensitivities identified earlier, but also because a framework agreement is lacking. Cooperation between Vietnam and the United States today is therefore focused primarily on non-sensitive issues, including military medicine, disaster relief, demining, search and rescue, and combating transnational challenges such as terrorism and illegal drug smuggling.
The Vietnamese government condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and offered its full cooperation to the United States, including permission for U.S. military aircraft to use the country's airspace. Although the Vietnamese do not consider a domestic terrorist attack very likely, Hanoi has upgraded security at airports and outside the U.S. Embassy. Similarly, although the security services have found no evidence of Islamic extremism among the country's small Muslim population (estimated at 65,000), they continue to monitor the situation carefully. One factor Hanoi must take into account in its relations with Washington is the view from Beijing. Vietnam and the PRC normalized relations in 1991 after more than a decade and a half of hostility and military conflict. Since normalization Sino-Vietnamese relations have improved considerably, but suspicions remain on both sides. In 1999 the two countries reached agreement on delineating their common land border, and in 2000 a similar agreement was reached on the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin sea border. However, the two countries continue to dispute sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea has done little to alleviate tensions between Hanoi and Beijing. In 2004 China objected to the expansion of an airport on one of the Vietnamese controlled islands, the inauguration of tourist cruises to the Spratlys, and Vietnamese plans to explore for oil in waters contested by both countries. For its part, Hanoi has accused China of violating the Declaration by agreeing with the Philippines to conduct seismic activity studies near the Spratlys, and conducting oil exploration activities in the Gulf of Tonkin. Vietnamese military officers and academicians who spoke with the author in August 2004 contended that the South China Sea dispute was intractable, and that Beijing's ultimate aim is to dominate the area and enforce its claims.
Hence, despite improved relations with China, Vietnam remains suspicious of Beijing's long-term intentions in Southeast Asia. It therefore supports a continued U.S. military presence in East Asia to balance the PRC. However, Vietnam must carefully calibrate its military ties with the United States so as not to offend China. Crucially Hanoi cannot let Beijing think that is part of a U.S.-led containment strategy against the PRC. Currently Vietnam's military-to-military links with the United States and China are roughly in equilibrium in terms of exchanges and visits. Hanoi cannot allow an asymmetrical situation to arise that favors the United States over China, as this would certainly raise Beijing's ire. Therefore, absent a resumption of severe Sino-Vietnamese tensions, a close defense relationship between Vietnam and the United States seems unlikely any time soon. Hanoi to improve its human rights record. A re-introduction of the Vietnam Human Rights Act into Congress may temporarily strain relations, though the legislation seems unlikely to succeed in the Senate. For reasons outlined above, bilateral defense ties will move forward in a step-by-step fashion with Hanoi keeping one eye on China.
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